NTP BUG 1331: DoS attack from certain NTP mode 7 packets
Last update: January 15, 2024 18:03 UTC (83e32bc41)
Summary
| Resolved |
4.2.4p8
4.2.6 |
08 December 2009 |
| References |
Bug 1331 |
CVE-2009-3563 |
| Affects |
All releases from xntp2 (1989) (possibly earlier) through 4.2.4 before 4.2.4p8 and all versions of 4.2.5. |
Resolved in 4.2.4p8 and 4.2.6. |
| CVSS2 Score |
6.4 |
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P |
Description
NTP mode 7 (MODE_PRIVATE) is used by the ntpdc query and control utility. In contrast, ntpq uses NTP mode 6 (MODE_CONTROL), while routine NTP time transfers use modes 1 through 5. Upon receipt of an incorrect mode 7 request or a mode 7 error response from an address which is not listed in a restrict ... noquery or restrict ... ignore statement, ntpd will reply with a mode 7 error response (and log a message). In this case:
- If an attacker spoofs the source address of
ntpd host A in a mode 7 response packet sent to ntpd host B, both A and B will continuously send each other error responses, for as long as those packets get through.
- If an attacker spoofs an address of
ntpd host A in a mode 7 response packet sent to ntpd host A, A will respond to itself endlessly, consuming CPU and logging excessively.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to 4.2.4p8 or 4.2.6, or later.
- Use
restrict ... noquery or restrict ... ignore in your ntp.conf file to limit the source addresses to which ntpd will respond.
- Filter NTP mode 7 packets coming into and/or going out of your network. This will likely interfere with your ability to use
ntpdc to manage NTP servers outside your network, or for a legitimate outsider to manage your servers. (If either of these is useful, a VPN is probably your friend.)
- Filter NTP mode 7 packets where both the source and destination ports are 123, the privileged NTP port. In most cases, legitimate
ntpdc mode 7 requests will have a source port not equal to 123 and a destination port of 123, while most legitimate responses will have a source port of 123 and a destination port not equal to 123.
- Employ anti-spoofing IP address filters at your borders to prevent UDP traffic claiming to be from a local address that originate outside your network. Prefer ISPs which employ unicast reverse path filtering (uRPF) to limit the spoofed traffic entering your network. See BCP 38/RFC 2827 and BCP 84/RFC3704 (multihomed networks) for additional details.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Robin Park and Dmitri Vinokurov of Alcatel-Lucent.
Timeline